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How	has	COVID-19	changed	lobbying	activity	across
Europe?
COVID-19	has	been	accompanied	by	a	high	level	of	lobbying	activity	as	businesses	and	interest
groups	seek	to	influence	government	policy.	Anne	Rasmussen	writes	that	while	the	relative	access
of	different	group	types	to	COVID-19	meetings	looks	similar	to	other	topics,	the	greater	use	of	digital
lobbying,	could	affect	potential	biases	in	the	representation	of	different	types	of	interest	group.
It’s	clear	that	globally,	the	COVID-19	crisis	has	consolidated	power	within	governments,	leaving
opposition	parties	in	a	bind.	Governments	have	acted	to	ringfence	decision	making	on	lockdowns,
special	emergency	measures,	recovery	funding	and	recently,	plans	for	reopening	societies.	Although	the	opposition
has	gradually	become	more	involved	in	many	countries,	criticism	of	the	lack	of	democratic	oversight	remains,	and
(with	hindsight)	the	necessity	and	severity	of	some	of	the	measures	adopted	has	been	questioned.
However,	COVID-19	has	not	only	affected	relationships	between	governments	and	their	opposition.	It	has	also
affected	lobbying	and	the	way	interest	groups	and	businesses	interact	with	policymakers.	Given	that	COVID-19	has
been	seen	by	many	as	the	biggest	global	crisis	since	WWII,	this	is	hardly	surprising.	The	crisis	has	blown	a	huge
hole	in	the	earnings	and	even	the	viability	of	a	wide	range	of	businesses,	and	has	had	a	profound	impact	on	the
daily	lives	of	billions.	This	has	galvanised	interest	groups	and	businesses	to	mobilise	–	while,	at	the	same	time,
governments	have	actively	reached	out	for	their	expertise.
Even	though	social	distancing	has	dramatically	reduced	opportunities	for	face-to-face	lobbying,	it’s	perhaps	not
surprising	that	figures	indicate	that	lobbying	spending	has	actually	increased	under	COVID-19.	In	the	US,	registry
data	gives	information	on	both	who’s	lobbying	on	which	issues	and	how	much	they	spend.	Based	on	preliminary
records,	Open	Secrets	reports	that	lobbying	expenditure	has	been	at	almost	record	levels	–	$903m	in	the	first
quarter	of	2020.	Much	attention	has	been	directed	at	the	largest	aid	package	in	US	history,	the	$2.2	trillion
Coronavirus	Aid,	Relief,	and	Economic	Security	(CARES)	Act.	CARES	is	also	–	unsurprisingly	–	the	second	most
heavily	lobbied	bill	in	US	history.
Records	from	the	US	and	Canada	reveal	that	the	pandemic	has	opened	up	the	lobbying	playing	field	to	many	new
players.	My	own	calculations	based	on	data	from	Transparency	International	also	demonstrate	high	lobbying
activity	related	to	COVID-19	in	the	EU:	~500	interest	groups	and	firms	have	held	meetings	with	EU	Commissioners
and	high-level	Commission	civil	servants	alone,	where	either	‘COVID’,	‘corona’	and/or	‘recovery’	was	mentioned	in
the	subject	description	of	the	meeting.	In	practice,	the	number	of	participants	is	likely	to	be	even	higher	given	that
not	all	meetings	relating	to	the	COVID-19	agenda	might	explicitly	have	mentioned	these	keywords	in	the	subject
description.
In	countries	where	there	are	less	stringent	rules	for	registering	lobbying	activity	and	expenditure,	it	is	harder	to
directly	measure	changes	during	COVID-19.	Yet,	we	know	anecdotally	from	news	reports	that	considerable
amounts	of	lobbying	have	been	directed	at	–	inter	alia	–	decisions	on	aid	packages,	‘air	bridges’	and	international
travel,	and	when	and	how	to	reopen	different	sectors	of	society.
In	some	respects,	lobbying	during	COVID-19	looks	like	business	as	usual.	After	all,	there	is	nothing	unusual	about
interest	groups	mobilising	when	there	is	something	at	stake	for	them,	or	about	governments	reaching	out	for
expertise	and	advice.	At	the	same	time,	the	way	interest	groups	have	participated	in	policymaking	during	COVID-19
has	also	been	somewhat	different	to	the	status	quo.	I	examine	some	of	these	new	developments	here,	and	I’ll
argue	that	paradoxically	they	may	both	strengthen	and	weaken	transparency	and	bias	in	interest	representation.
COVID-19,	lobbying	and	(digital)	democracy
First,	opposition	parties	and	interest	organisations	have	had	limited	chances	to	unpick	or	dissect	rapidly	enacted
emergency	legislation,	or	relief	packages.	Nonetheless,	they	have	often	been	consulted	and	brought	into	the
decision-making	tent	in	novel	ways.
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In	February	and	March,	at	the	beginning	of	the	crisis,	open	hearings,	which	are	conventional	in	many	systems	and
allow	everyone	to	participate	and	submit	evidence,	were	either	cancelled,	or	were	implemented	with	greatly
compressed	deadlines.	Interactions	have	been	focused	on	governments	and	there	has	been	a	shift	from	open	to
closed	consultations.	Denmark	is	a	good	example:	the	government	has	created	a	series	of	“sector	partner
communities”,	through	which	stakeholders	advise	the	government,	for	example	on	guidelines	for	the	reopening	of
specific	sectors.
It	is	too	early	to	tell	how	these	differences	in	the	forms	of	stakeholder	consultation	used	during	COVID-19	have
impacted	how	inclusive	governments	have	been	in	their	dealings	with	interest	groups.	Closed	forms	of	consultation
clearly	present	a	risk	of	privileging	certain	selected	stakeholder	interests	over	those	without	a	seat	at	the	table.	Yet
closed	fora	can	–	counter	intuitively	–	also	give	equal	voice	to	a	range	of	organisations,	rather	than	favouring	those
with	the	greatest	(spending)	power.	Existing	literature	on	EU	consultations	has	shown,	for	example,	that	domination
by	business	interests	is	weaker	when	decision-makers	only	use	closed	forms	of	consultation,	compared	to	when
they	use	both	open	and	closed	forms.
Experiences	of	corona	lobbyism	thus	far	is	not	just	about	changed	frameworks	for	consultation,	but	also	about	how
organisations	themselves	choose	to	act	–	and	how	much	access	decision-makers	permit	them.	In	line	with
Churchill’s	maxim	to	“never	waste	a	good	crisis”,	business	organisations	and	companies	have	been	accused	of
exploiting	the	crisis	for	their	own	benefit.	Business	stakeholders	have	lobbied	for	more	flexible	(i.e	lax)
environmental	regulation	in	order	to	survive	the	financial	challenges	precipitated	by	the	outbreak.	The	Corporate
Europe	Observatory	has	established	“Corona	Lobby	Watch”	to	keep	track	of	what	it	dubs	“corona	washing”.	The
website	contains	stories	of	industries	“reinventing”	old	demands	or	formulating	new	ones,	using	COVID-19	as
justification.	Even	in	the	absence	of	a	clear	definition	of	“corona	washing”,	the	anecdotes	on	their	website	give
some	examples	of	what	lobbying	during	COVID-19	looks	like.
My	own	unpublished	analysis	on	who	has	been	provided	access	to	meetings	with	high-level	Commission	civil
servants	and	Commissioners	reveals	a	strong	business	dominance	among	participants	in	meetings	explicitly
mentioning	‘COVID’,	‘corona’	or	‘recovery’	in	the	subject	description.
According	to	Figure	1,	companies,	and	trade	and	business	associations,	account	for	two-thirds	(64%)	of	all	the
participating	actors.	But	it’s	important	to	point	out:	even	if	there	are	differences	in	the	relative	prominence	of
different	types	of	interest	groups	in	COVID	and	non-COVID	meetings,	such	differences	are	not	overly	stark.	The
share	of	companies	and	trade	and	business	associations	is	ten	percentage	points	higher	for	COVID	than	non-
COVID	related	meetings	during	the	von	der	Leyen	Commission	(sign	at	p<0.01)	but	the	score	for	COVID	meetings
is	not	significantly	different	from	the	Juncker	Commission.
In	fact,	the	overall	representation	of	business	interests	under	COVID-19	and	the	Juncker	Commission	are	almost
identical.	While	there	are	small	drops	in	the	shares	of	both	NGOs	and	unions	participating	in	COVID	related
meetings,	they	are	not	significant	from	the	rest	of	the	von	der	Leyen	meetings.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	NGOs
have	actually	been	far	better	represented	in	COVID-19	related	meetings	than	they	were	during	the	Juncker
Commission	(sign	at	p<0.01).	Overall,	these	access	patterns	of	different	group	types	to	COVID-19	meetings	show
clear	patterns	of	continuity,	rather	than	demonstrating	a	fundamentally	negative	shift	in	bias	and	diversity.
Figure	1:	Prominence	of	different	types	of	organisations	by	subject	and	period
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Note:	Own	calculations	based	on	data	from	Integrity	Watch	by	Transparency	International.	COVID-19	related	meetings	are	coded	as
mentioning	“COVID”,	“Corona”	and/or	“Recovery”	in	the	subject	description.	Meetings	up	until	May	20,	2020	are	included.	The	total
number	of	actors	participating	in	meetings	was	23,801	(Juncker),	505	(COVID	&	recovery	meetings),	2,164	(Remaining	von	der
Leyen).
Another	development	worth	highlighting	is	that	social	distancing	under	COVID-19	has	increased	digital	interest
representation.	Until	February,	fewer	than	one	per	cent	of	participants	were	registered	as	having	taken	part	in	digital
meetings	with	the	Commission.	Between	1	February	and	20	May,	the	share	rises	to	38%,	and	for	participants	in
COVID-19	related	meetings,	it	is	as	high	as	84%.
These	figures	may	even	underestimate	the	number	of	digital	participants,	since	the	Commission	might	have	failed
to	report	some	forms	of	digital	contact,	or	not	always	have	registered	that	meetings	took	place	digitally.	The
significance	and	stickability	of	this	shift	from	offline	to	digital	advocacy	is	something	that	I	will	examine	in	much
more	detail	in	my	European	Research	Council	project	ADVODID.	Digital	tools	–	such	as	social	media	–	are
sometimes	seen	as	“weapons	of	the	weak”	allowing	resource-poor	organisations	to	generate	content	at	a	relatively
low	cost	with	the	potentially	high	impact.	Social	media	also	have	the	potential	to	increase	transparency	of	lobbying
by	leaving	a	discernable	electronic	audit	trail.
But	research	so	far	has	primarily	shown	that	digital	technology	and	social	media	do	not	necessarily	have	the
democratising	potential	some	expected.	There	is	a	danger	that	digital	tools	merely	host	“new	wine	in	old	bottles”,
reinforcing	offline	inequalities	in	access	and	influence.	It	has	also	been	pointed	out	that	a	lack	of	physical	events
further	disadvantages	precisely	those	organisations,	journalists	and	citizens	that	find	it	difficult	to	secure	face	time
with	decisionmakers	anyway.	They	can	no	longer	use	public	events	to	compensate	for	limited	direct	access,	and
digital	tools	may	be	more	suitable	for	managing	existing	contacts	than	for	building	up	new	ones.
The	access	data	on	meetings	with	the	European	Commission	reveals	some	interesting	patterns	when	we	compare
how	prominent	different	types	of	interest	are,	depending	on	whether	they	participated	in	digital	sessions	and
meetings	related	to	COVID-19.	Figure	2	underlines	that	my	conclusion	–	that	business	interests	dominate	–	applies
across	all	categories	of	the	disaggregated	dataset,	except	COVID-19	meetings	not	reported	as	having	taken	place
digitally.	While	the	prominence	of	different	types	of	organisations	in	digital	and	non-digital	meetings	is	broadly
similar	for	non-COVID-19	related	meetings,	there	are	some	differences	between	these	two	categories	for	COVID-19
related	meetings.
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Here,	business	interests	account	for	a	considerably	larger	proportion	of	participants	in	the	meetings	that	are
reported	as	having	taken	place	digitally	than	in	the	remaining	meetings	(sign	at	p<0.01).	Companies,	but	also
business	associations,	have	been	more	prominent	among	participants	in	the	digital	COVID-19	meetings.	For	NGOs,
the	picture	is	reversed.	Their	share	of	participants	in	digital	meetings	is	36	percentage	points	lower	than	for
meetings	that	were	not	reported	to	have	taken	place	digitally	(sign	at	p<0.01).	Given	uncertainty	as	to	whether	the
Commission	has	always	reported	when	the	format	was	digital	and	the	relatively	low	number	of	participants	in	the
“non-digital”	COVID-19	category,	we	need	to	be	careful	not	to	over-interpret	these	numbers.	At	the	same	time,
these	differences	merit	more	researching	on	whether	digital	advocacy	has	exacerbated	some	pre-existing	offline
inequalities	during	the	COVID-19	period.
Figure	2:	Share	of	different	types	of	organisations	by	subject	and	format
Note:	Own	calculations	based	on	data	from	Integrity	Watch	by	Transparency	International.	Digital	meetings	are	those	where	either
the	location	or	description	of	the	meeting	indicates	they	were	non-physical.	They	include	phone/conference	calls	and	different	types
of	video	meetings/conferences.
Of	course,	it	is	still	too	early	to	conclude	how	the	crisis	has	affected	lobbying.	COVID-19	has	the	potential	to
strengthen,	weaken	or	(indeed!)	not	affect	transparency	and	bias	in	interest	representation.	Not	surprisingly,	my
preliminary	analysis	of	access	teases	out	patterns	of	both	continuity	and	change.	While	the	relative	access	of
different	group	types	to	COVID-19	meetings	looks	similar	to	what	we	see	on	other	topics,	the	format	of	advocacy
(digital	as	opposed	to	non-digital,	open	vs	closed	forms	of	consultation	etc.)	might	affect	potential	biases	in	the
representation	of	different	types	of	interest	groups.	Future	research	should	examine	how	advocates	and
policymakers	have	made	use	of	different	offline	and	digital	tools	during	COVID-19,	and	how	successful	their	efforts
ultimately	were.
No	matter	the	final	verdict,	it	is	more	evident	than	ever	that	an	important	determinant	of	how	we	get	through	the
crisis	lies	not	only	in	the	interaction	between	government	and	opposition,	but	in	the	(digital)	interaction	between
elected	representatives	and	interest	groups	during	the	coming	months.
_______________
Note:	the	above	was	first	published	on	LSE	EUROPP.	Photo	by	Pawel	Chu	on	Unsplash.
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